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The Problems with Prediction
The Dark Room Problem and the Scope Dispute
Andrew Sims
There is a disagreement over the scope of explanation for predictive process-
ing. While some proponents think that it is best motivated from—and indeed 
comprises an explanation of—biological self-organization, others maintain that it 
should only be a theory of neurocognitive function, or even just of some limited 
domain of neurocognitive function. Something that these theorists share is an in-
terest in addressing the dark-room problem: at its most naïve, if action is driven by 
the minimization of surprise then why don’t cognitive creatures act to minimize 
stimuli in general? The dark-room problem is in fact best conceived as a cluster of 
related concerns, rather than as a single argument against action-oriented pre-
dictive processing. These have to do with: i) whether PP (predictive processing) 
has any substantive empirical content when it is pitched in very general domains; 
ii) whether a specification can be given of the environmental niche that action 
moves the organism to occupy, and which is not the dark room; and iii) whether 
an adequate account can be given within this specification of exploratory and 
exploitative behaviours. There are interesting conceptual relations between the 
dark-room problem and the scope dispute. As the putative scope of predictive 
processing gets wider (culminating in the free energy principle), the resources 
that are available for answering the concerns about niche-specification become 
very rich. But increasingly puzzling problems arise as to the implementation of 
surprise-minimisation within non-paradigmatically cognitive biological systems. 
On the other hand, under more restrictive construals of the scope of predictive 
processing, there are new difficulties standing in the way of niche-specification, 
and new questions about the interface between surprise-minimisation and mod-
el-free cognition undermine the promise of predictive processing as a unifier of 
theories of neurocognitive function in subordinate domains. In this paper I make 
explicit the dialectic between proponents and critics in order to show how the 
two problems are related.
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1  Predictive Processing and the Scope Dispute 
Predictive processing (PP) is the name for a class of theories in cognitive neuroscience which present 
the prospect of unifying various accounts of perception, action, and very many other ordinary and 
pathological cognitive phenomena. Roughly, the central idea is that both perception and action can be 
explained in terms of a mechanism whose sole function is the minimisation of surprise. There are an 
astounding range of ordinary and pathological cognitive phenomena that have possible explanations 
expressed in the theoretical vocabulary of PP, and the number of these continues to grow.
Surprise—often also called surprisal or self-information to distinguish it from phenomenological 
surprise (Clark 2013a)—is a quantity from information theory that describes how likely some event 
or set of events is, given some model that assigns probabilities over events. To make the distinction be-
tween information-theoretic and phenomenological surprise concrete, Clark gives the example of an 
elephant being smuggled onstage during a magic show. Given the context, this is not very surprising 
in an information-theoretic sense. Such things may be expected to happen in the context of a magic 
show. However, we may expect the audience to experience phenomenological surprise. In its broadest 
and least controversial formulation, PP states that some neurocognitive functions can be explained 
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in terms of the minimisation of information-theoretic surprise. In stronger formulations of PP the 
explanatory scope of surprise minimisation becomes wider, from the extension of the mechanism to 
action (Friston 2009) all the way up to its application in understanding adaptive behaviour in general 
(Friston 2013). The details of PP will have already been discussed at length by the other contributors 
to this volume, and so I will not belabour the details except to remind the reader of its key features.
Consider then the problem of under-determination for visual perception. One pattern of retinal stim-
ulation (a set of sensory states) is compatible with very many interpretations of its causes due to ambigu-
ities that arise from distance, occlusion, and noise; the task in visual perception is to construct the best 
possible interpretation on the basis of that pattern. This means producing a visual scene on the basis of 
the retinal stimulation. One way to eliminate ambiguity is to interpret the sensory states on the basis of a 
model of the causes of those states. That resolves ambiguities by discounting interpretations of the states 
that are less likely, given that model. Thus, to give an informal example, we are able to perceive a particu-
lar pattern of sensory states as an old or young woman rather than as a truly ambiguous figure (Figure 1).
Figure 1: The “young woman/old woman” ambiguous figure (Boring 1930).
PP posits a computational architecture that is capable of successfully implementing a species of this 
basic top-down strategy (Rao and Ballard 1999). Imagine a model of the causes of sensory states that 
is hierarchical, and for which each level in the hierarchy is predicting the states of the level below it 
(it is generative, since it generates predictions of the sensory states it should encounter if the model is 
true). So at each level there is a comparison between the actual states which are propagated upwards 
from lower levels and laterally, and predicted states that are propagated downwards from higher levels 
and laterally. These can either match or not. If they do not match, then the actual state is propagated 
upwards as a prediction error signal, and the parameters at the higher level are updated on the basis of 
that prediction error in line with the norms of Bayesian belief-updating. So the higher-up parameters 
that generate predictions are treated as prior beliefs (in the form of probability distributions) about 
the way that states at the lower level will behave, and they are updated where they fail to predict those 
states accurately.1 This means that the mechanism as a whole can slowly approach being an accurate 
model of the causes of sensory states, and that it does so by the minimisation of prediction error, 
which is an upper bound on surprise. PP states that neurocognitive systems implement a hierarchi-
cal generative model of this kind, with sensory states at the lowest level in the hierarchy, and that the 
model of the causes of those states is the content of perception—in this context, the visual scene.
1 “Prior belief ” is a term of art here, however. It refers to whatever plays the functional role of top-down prediction in the hierarchical generative model. 
It’s not to be taken as indicating the existence of a propositional attitude.
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More expansive versions of this broad kind of proposal make room for multiple perceptual modal-
ities in the hierarchy and include suggestions that it extends upwards into more abstract and amodal 
predictions. On this hypothesis we posit a more abstract hierarchical model about the causes of senso-
ry states that helps inform perception in multiple modalities. For example, my interpretation of some 
set of sensory states in audition may be disambiguated by more general beliefs about the context of 
the states—I may interpret those states as being caused by the clanging of pots and pans on the basis 
of a prior belief that the origin of those states is from behind a door which I can see is clearly marked 
“KITCHEN,” and on the basis of prior beliefs to do with kitchens more generally. Although it is not 
uncontroversial as to what each of the levels represents (Vance 2015), one way to make sense of the 
notion is that each level in the ascending hierarchy represents the world at an ever increasing level of 
spatiotemporal generality (e.g., Hohwy 2013, pp. 28-30).2
For a mechanism like this to work effectively, it needs to be able to distinguish between signal and 
noise. What that means is that it needs to evaluate how likely some datum is to be genuinely indic-
ative of a causal regularity in the world. A hypothetical example of a situation in which a datum is 
not genuinely informative in the right kind of way can be given in the context of the measurement of 
population growth. If I am trying to measure long-term growth in tourism in Rio de Janeiro during 
the Olympics, for example, I will get a reading that is not genuinely informative about tourism growth 
in that city over a longer period of time. It is a noisy datum. Updating a Bayesian model on the basis 
of noisy data leads to overfitting; an overfitted model is greatly reduced in its predictive power because 
it contains redundant parameters and does not easily generalise to new data. So an effective Bayesian 
model needs to modulate its updating on the basis of the reliability of error, that is, how likely an er-
ror is to be genuinely informative about a causal regularity. In PP, this function is performed by the 
precision weighting of prediction error. A precise prediction error—a prediction error which has been 
directly assigned a high precision value—is considered very reliable, and so the model is updated on 
the basis of that error without much attenuation. But imprecise prediction error is treated as noisy 
and unreliable, and is therefore more likely to be attenuated if any updating occurs at all. The model 
therefore also needs to maintain a higher-order model of precision, in order that imprecise error can 
be treated as such; predictions are treated as more reliable than prediction error under conditions of 
sensory uncertainty.
It’s possible to explain action according to this same basic computational architecture. Whereas 
perception is thought to function through an alteration of prior beliefs on the basis of prediction er-
ror, action is construed as the minimisation of prediction error through an alteration of the way that 
sensory states are sampled. That is to say that the world is sampled such that some set of predictions 
come out true (but this is not merely a corroborative but also a disambiguating process, as in the case 
of the visual saccade, for example, Friston et al. 2012a). In the simplest case the way this might occur is 
that the model predicts some set of proprioceptive states corresponding to the movement of the body, 
and then realises those proprioceptive states by the propagation of prediction through classical reflex 
arcs. Where prediction error is encountered (that is, at the stage when the predicted outcome of the 
movement does not yet obtain), this error is assigned a very low precision, and so resampled in such a 
way that the predictions come out true. But the same basic principle can be posited for more complex 
actions and higher levels of planning, so that the predictive-processing theorist can explain my walk to 
the cafeteria in terms of the visual, auditory, tactile, and other sensory states that I predict to encounter 
during the course of that action. It is the minimisation of prediction error that drives the action, but 
2 What I mean by representation here should be spelled out. The extent to which PP requires representations, and of what kind, is controversial (see 
Clark 2016, §6.6, and Hohwy In Press, for diverging views). So I shall here assume a weak and inclusive notion: for these purposes the term “repre-
sentation” describes an isomorphism between one or more physical particulars and a cause or structured set of causes within the world, so that the 
particular(s) carry information about their causes in a specific manner (Dretske 1981). That is a very weak notion, but it can be supplemented with 
further conditions, such as a history of playing a particular role for a system that consumes the representation (e.g., Millikan 1984). Similarly, given 
the possibly wide scope of PP (section 3.3), it seems prudent to assume a pluralism about representation, on which the content of representations may 
be fixed by different kinds of facts in different kinds of representational system (Shea 2013).
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it is minimised by resampling, rather than updating. This way of distinguishing between perception 
and action within PP mirrors a distinction in the philosophy of science between theory-revision and 
experiment (see Hohwy 2013, p. 43, for a nice illustration of this).
Everything that I have explained so far is relatively uncontroversial, except for the way that some 
of the finer details should be elucidated, for example, whether the hierarchy should be conceived in 
terms of spatiotemporal or computational depth. But there is a more significant disagreement over 
the scope of the explanation (Sims 2016). That is to say that not everybody who endorses the general 
mode of explanation can agree on how much it is supposed to be an explanation for. On this matter, 
four very general positions can be distinguished (see Table 1). I should note at this point that I do not 
mean to imply that these positions are consistently held by any particular researchers, except perhaps 
implicitly. This taxonomy is supposed to be of heuristic value, in mapping out the conceptual possibil-
ities. On the first position (minimal predictive processing), PP is only to be construed as a theory of 
any number of perceptual processes—perhaps visual perception, for example. This is a rare position in 
the philosophical literature, however, since one thing that seems to be broadly agreed on is that one of 
the reasons that PP is so interesting is that it can give a unified explanation of perception and action 
in terms of the same mechanism. This position is also not vulnerable to the dark room problem, and 
for these reasons it is not relevant for the purposes of my exposition. On the second position (mixed 
predictive processing), PP is to be interpreted as a theory of just some neurocognitive processes of 
both perceptual and motor kinds. That means that the explanatory burden for neurocognitive func-
tion is shared amongst both PP and other kinds of models in a “mixed” theory. For example, one may 
suggest that there are mechanisms involved in action which are “model-free,” and do not require a 
representation of the causes of sensory states. One may insist, for example, that neurocognitive func-
tion includes “complex admixtures of strategies including the canny use of bodily form and various 
‘representation-lean’ ploys.” (Clark 2013b, p. 8) On the third position (maximal predictive processing), 
PP is to be construed as a complete theory of all neurocognitive function. That means that all neuro-
cognitive function can be explained in terms of the minimisation of prediction error. A proponent of 
this position will insist on the “preposterous” nature of the hypothesis: “it leaves no other job for the 
brain to do than minimise free energy3—so that everything mental must come down to this principle.” 
(Hohwy 2015, pp. 8-9)4 On the fourth, and boldest, position, the mechanism described in PP is not 
only to be understood as a complete theory of neurocognitive function but of adaptive behaviour in 
general; all adaptive behaviour is understood in terms of the minimisation of surprise. It seems clear 
that Karl J. Friston intends the “free energy principle” to be taken in this way:
Most treatments of self-organization in theoretical biology have addressed the peculiar resistance 
of biological systems to the dispersive effects of fluctuations in their environment by appealing to 
statistical thermodynamics and information theory. Recent formulations try to explain adaptive 
behavior in terms of minimizing an upper (free energy) bound on the surprise (negative log-like-
lihood) of sensory samples. This minimization usefully connects the imperative for biological sys-
tems to maintain their sensory states within physiological bounds, with an intuitive understanding 
of adaptive behavior in terms of active inference about the causes of those states. (Friston 2013, p. 1)
For all of these positions (except the minimal position) there is a conceptual difficulty with the ex-
planation of action that has been called “the dark room problem.” (Friston et al. 2012b). That problem 
is an apparent consequence of the explanation of action—and therefore motivation as well—on the 
sole basis of the minimisation of surprise.
3 Free energy is the long term average of prediction-error, and therefore an upper bound on surprise over the long term.
4 It’s probable that Hohwy holds a stronger position than this—for example, it seems that he may be willing to countenance an interpretation of natural 
selection in terms of surprise minimisation (see in particular Hohwy 2015, p. 10)—but what he says here exemplifies well the commitments of the 
maximal predictive-processing theorist in general.
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Table 1: Kinds of positions with respect to the scope of PP.
Position Scope
Minimal predictive processing Some perceptual processes
Mixed predictive processing Some perceptual and motor processes
Maximal predictive processing All neurocognitive processes
Free energy principle All biological processes, on multiple timescales
2  Three Aspects of the Dark-room Problem
The way that the dark room problem puts pressure on PP and its extension to action can be captured 
in the following line of reasoning. First, the critic claims that the explanation of action on the basis of 
prediction-error minimisation entails that the agent is always acting to minimise surprise. Second, it 
is inferred that this basic principle means that the ideal surprise-minimising agent should be expected 
to seek out a place where it can be free of surprising and unanticipated stimuli. And this would be an 
environment that is free of any stimuli whatsoever; this is the “dark room” that gives the problem its 
name. But then, the critic goes on, this is an absurd consequence; this kind of behaviour would spell 
extinction for any agent which carried it out. That is because an environment without any stimuli is 
also an environment without any nourishment or opportunity to reproduce. A creature which behaved 
in this way would not survive, and it would not pass on its genes to offspring. It follows by modus tol-
lens, then, that action must be driven by processes which are not surprise-minimizing. This is how the 
problem is spelled out in its most basic terms. But in fact as we shall see it is better conceived as a way 
to articulate a cluster of related concerns, rather than a unitary argument with a single conclusion. I 
will be arguing that there are three distinct difficulties that are raised here. The first, the negative prob-
lem, concerns the apparent result that surprise-minimisation entails that the agent seeks to rid itself 
of stimuli altogether; the second, the positive problem, concerns the presumed poverty of behaviour 
that could be produced by mere surprise-minimisation (the charge is that it fails to account for rich 
repertoires of exploratory, exploitative, and playful behaviour); the third, the problem of triviality, is 
a sceptical concern about whether the extension of scope means sapping PP of any empirical content, 
rendering it trivial. What unifies these problems under the “dark room” rubric is that they originate in 
the concerns about how to model motivation within the framework; this is an issue which is revealed 
starkly in the dark room scenario. The reason that the problem of empirical content is also related to 
the dark room scenario is that it is attempts to address the positive problem in terms of evolutionarily 
selected “deep” priors which gives rise to the charge of triviality; this will be made clear in section 3.3.
2.1  The Negative Problem
The negative problem is the aspect that is the most initially intuitive. It is the identification of sur-
prise-minimisation with stimuli-minimisation in general. There is a sense in which all stimuli are 
minimally surprising, if one takes the baseline for stimulation to be the state of the organism prior 
to the stimuli. That is to say that any stimuli will be a change in what the organism’s current state is, 
and be surprising in virtue of this difference, however minimal. On top of this, it appears to be that a 
consistently applied PP framework will place surprise-minimisation as the sole principle that drives 
action. This need not be the case—a contrary example would be the mixed models of section 3.1—but 
this is certainly the case for the more ambitious readings of PP on which it is supposed to suffice as a 
unified theory of all the processes underlying perception and action.
So with these two pieces in place, the negative problem states that insofar as all stimuli are mini-
mally surprising, and insofar as a consistently applied PP must place surprise-minimisation as the sole 
principle driving action, then it seems that the surprise-minimising agent ought to minimise stimuli 
in general. But that seems wrong, or at least at odds with what we know about living things: they don’t 
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seek to minimise stimuli in general. So something has gone awry. Either the analysis of all stimuli as 
minimally surprising is incorrect, or it’s wrong to say that all action is the minimisation of surprise.5 
Here are two examples of the dark room problem thus characterised in the literature. The first is in a 
paper by Schwartenbeck and collaborators, who aim to give a formal treatment of the issue, and who 
are one of the first to explicitly distinguish the negative and positive problems: “Should we not, in 
accordance with the principle, prefer living in a highly predictable and un-stimulating environment 
where we could minimize our long-term surprise?” (Schwartenbeck et al. 2013) And another more 
recent example, from Clark’s recent and comprehensive book-length treatment of the philosophical 
issues associated with PP:
The hapless prediction-driven organism, the worry goes, should simply seek out states that are eas-
ily predicted, such as an empty darkened room in which to spend the remainder of its increasingly 
hungry, thirsty, and depressing days. This is the so-called ‘Darkened Room Puzzle’. (Clark 2016, 
p. 262)
That is the baseline concern that one can take away from the dark room problem: that minimising 
surprise entails minimising stimuli. One may deal with this problem by rejecting either of the two 
premises that lead to that result: either that all stimuli are surprising or that all action is surprise mi-
nimisation. On the first strategy, we are owed an explanation of why some stimuli are surprising and 
why others are not; on the second, we are owed an account of the other mechanisms that drive action, 
and how they are related to PP.
2.2  The Positive Problem
Typically, then, the PP theorist rejects the premise that all stimuli are minimally surprising. She rejects 
this on the basis that surprise minimisation always occurs relative to a model which assigns probabil-
ities over possible sensory states, based on a set of (Bayesian) prior beliefs about the structured causes 
which produce those sensory states. This hierarchical generative model predicts the states that the 
agent will encounter, and it’s on this basis that the least surprising state is in fact not a ‘blank slate’, as 
the negative problem assumes, but rather the kind of environment that the agent already expects to 
encounter. For prediction-error minimising agents, action is driven by prediction error relative to a 
set of predictions about the optimum states for the agent to be in. And this, the PP theorist will say, is 
by no means the darkened room of the negative problem. 
Now, the positive problem has to do with the role that is left for uniquely motivational states to play 
in PP, once their traditional role has been usurped by “prior beliefs” or “predictions” about the agent’s 
sensory states, and which drive action on the PP framework. It may be that, by positing the influence 
of a model of causes of sensory states, the PP theorist can show how the negative problem is mistaken. 
She can do so by pointing out that the sensory states that the agent expects to be in are species specific 
and are specified on the basis of an agent’s prior adaptation to a particular ecological niche. But this 
seems to imply that we are left without the classical distinction between representations with different 
directions of fit, because the way that action works within PP is by minimising surprise with respect 
to prior beliefs rather than maximising utility with respect to the agent’s desires. Thus we see Pezzulo 
and colleagues claim that:
[…] our scheme for behavioural control is based on Bayesian inference and does not call on reward 
prediction errors for learning or inference. One advantage of this is that the concept of rewards 
is replaced by the realization of prior preferences. This means that epistemic value and pragmatic 
5 Klein (in press) notes that this problem is recognised early on by Mumford (Mumford 1992). But in fact the problem is extant even earlier on; even 
Freud (Freud 1950 [1895]), who inherits the Fechnerian (Fecher 1873) conception of cognition as the minimisation of quantity, is compelled to posit 
the “reality principle” in order to address very similar issues.
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value (e.g., utility or reward functions) have the same currency and can be accommodated within 
the same (information hungry) Bayesian scheme […] (Pezzulo et al. 2015, p. 27)
However, this may render a large number of observable behaviours inexplicable – those behaviours 
that are playful, exploratory, and exploitative. In other words, reducing the states driving action to 
states that predict future states of affairs means that we can no longer make a cogent distinction be-
tween what is probable for an agent and what is of value for it, and we need the concept of value to 
explain why there are unlikely or uncertain states that are nonetheless valuable or desirable on the part 
of the agent. It’s fairly intuitive to judge that states with high utility for an agent are not always those 
with high prior probability, and putative examples of this dissociation are becoming ever more wide-
spread in the critical literature:
Should the first amphibian out of water dive back in? If a wolf eats deer not because he is hungry, 
but because he is attracted to the equilibrium state of his ancestors, would a sudden bonanza of deer 
inspire him to eat only the amount to which he is accustomed? Should a person immersed in the 
“statistical bath” of poverty her entire life refuse a winning lottery ticket, since this would necessi-
tate transitioning from a state of high equilibrium to a rare one? (Gershman and Daw 2012, p. 306)
In other words, even if the dark room scenario does not obtain (agents don’t aim to minimise all stim-
uli) we should still expect an agent who only minimises surprise with respect to a model of the causes 
of sensory states to lack many of the playful, exploratory, and exploitative behaviours that we observe 
in the natural world—and perhaps more pertinently, in ourselves.6 For example, it is not necessarily 
adaptive for an agent to consume resources in amounts predicted by past consumption—especially if 
past consumption was in meagre amounts. We would expect that agent, if adaptive, to exploit any sud-
den availability of resources. The criticism that surprise-minimisation does not predict such behavior 
remains live even after the negative problem is resolved by appeal to a model which relativises surprise 
minimisation to a particular set of prior beliefs.
2.3  The Triviality Problem
The triviality problem has to do with the empirical content of PP. Stated baldly, it is a concern that PP, 
when pitched at a sufficiently wide scope, may turn out to lack empirical content. This is a problem 
that is most often associated with the widest-scoped version of PP, the free energy principle. The free 
energy principle becomes relevant at this point because one way in which the positive problem may be 
overcome is to expand the scope of the model in order to include evolutionary influences. That would 
offer a possible way of addressing the issue because it can explain the existence of the problematic 
behaviours in terms of priors that are evolutionarily specified. It does not require that these priors be 
learned from the environment. It can do so because evolution is itself construed as the minimisation 
of surprise at phylogenetic timescales. 
Although the triviality issue is very often raised informally at conferences, it is less widespread 
in print.7 But I can provide two loci at which the issue is raised explicitly by critics. The first is in the 
original discussion of the dark room problem itself, in the dialogue between Friston, Thornton, and 
Clark. In responding to the notion that the negative problem is dissolved by appeal to the model of the 
causes of sensory states, Thornton makes the charge that: “If we allow unlimited rein over the inter-
pretations [i.e., models] agents are assumed to apply, the dark room problem can be eliminated. But 
the hypothesis then seems to be stating something that is true by definition.” (Friston et al. 2012b, p. 1)
6 Of course, there are various ways in the literature to deal with this concern, see especially section 3.2 below.
7 Though more so with respect to Bayesian models of cognition in general, cf., Bowers and Davis 2012.
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Indeed, this sometimes seems to be the case, and a tautological reading of the free energy principle 
is even sometimes endorsed quite explicitly. Look at what Friston himself says in the same article: 
“The tautology here is deliberate […] Like adaptive fitness, the free-energy formulation is not a mech-
anism or magic recipe for life; it is just a characterization of biological systems that exist.” (Friston et 
al. 2012b, p. 2) The concern here is therefore that the characterisation of all action as surprise-min-
imisation reduces to a definition or tautology, and does not constitute an empirical hypothesis that 
generates substantive predictions or explains causes in the world.8
One way to interpret this is a concern about falsifiability. That would be to say that the free energy 
principle is not falsifiable, because it is compatible with every state of affairs. It therefore lacks empir-
ical content. Although the falsifiability interpretation of the triviality problem is a common critical 
refrain, is has been noted that the objection lacks some force (Hohwy 2015, p. 14-15). Firstly, it is a 
widespread view that falsifiability is not sufficient nor even necessary for something to be a genuine 
scientific explanation. Secondly, the relationship between biological function and natural selection 
seems similarly definitional or conceptual in this way, but almost nobody denies that the theory of 
natural selection is an empirical theory that describes a causal process (Ruse 2008, pp. 44-45).
So with the natural selection analogy in mind, one way to deal with the triviality problem has been 
to argue that the value of PP will come out of its pragmatic value in constraining more local empirical 
hypotheses that describe mechanisms more limited in scope. And it may not only act as a general 
constraint (perhaps in the same way that the laws of physics (controversially) constrain explanations 
of particular systems), but also perhaps be suggestive of explanations in subordinate domains like 
systems biology and abnormal psychology.
That then leads us to the second place where this concern is raised at length in the literature, and 
to the more subtle version of the triviality problem that it constitutes, in a soon-to-be-published treat-
ment by Klein (Klein in press). Klein notes that even if it is the case that PP and the attendant free 
energy principle admits of pragmatic value in producing hypotheses, the fact that its proponents quite 
openly admit the tautological nature of the wider scoped hypotheses is problematic:
Appeal to apparent tautologies should trouble you. For whatever tautologies do, they don’t explain 
why things happen. At best, they give us reason to believe that something is the case. But philoso-
phy of science has moved away from epistemic conceptions of explanation and towards ontic ones 
[…] Good explanations detail a causal story, and it is not obvious that [the free energy principle] 
does so. (Klein in press)
That leaves no empirical content for the theory itself – it is rather what Klein, after McMullin (McMul-
lin 1985), calls a “Galilean idealisation.” Like the frictionless plane, the content of the free energy prin-
ciple would on this view be literally false, though perhaps useful in formulating empirical hypotheses 
if taken with a grain of salt. It remains to be seen what consequences this has for the way we should 
think about the theory, both in an epistemic (does it make endorsement of it less justified?) and onto-
logical (what entities and processes does it imply?) sense.
Such is the dialectic that leads us through the three aspects of the dark room problem. The initial 
intuition is that replacing conventional motivational imperatives with the imperative to minimise 
surprise entails absurd consequences—that the best strategy for surprise minimisation would be the 
minimisation of sensation in general. That produces the appearance of a dilemma, with two cor-
responding ways to reply: either sensation is not minimally surprising or not all motivation is sur-
prise-minimisation. The latter is relatively undesirable, since it undermines the unificatory appeal of 
PP. But the former is easily followed, given that PP includes the notion of a model of causes of sensory 
8 An anonymous reviewer suggests that this is a straw man. But it is a view clearly held by critics: “[Thornton:] we can certainly view the process by 
which agents adapt to their environments as a process by which they reduce their surprise. The problem is we can also view it the other way around, 
seeing the situation in terms of agents reducing their surprise by adapting to the environment.” (Friston et al. 2012b, p. 1)
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states within which there are states that are less surprising than an absence of states altogether. But 
even with the model taken into account, one may doubt whether the imperative of surprise-minimi-
sation can produce complex behaviours like play and exploration. Last, there also seems to be a prob-
lem of triviality for wider-scoped free energy principle that is also related to the dark room problem. 
That emerges out of the appearance of tautology in the claim that all adaptive behaviour is free energy 
minimisation, and challenges the ability of free energy theorists to provide substantive empirical hy-
potheses regarding specific mechanisms.
3  Three Replies to the Dark-Room Problem 
3.1  Mixed Predictive Processing
On first gloss, it seems that the issues associated with the dark room problem pushes us towards a view 
that is mixed. A view that is mixed is a view that makes room for cognitive processes that are not sur-
prise-minimisation. (Clark 2016) is the most thorough working out of a view like this that exists in the 
philosophical literature, though it is (Pezzulo et al. 2015) that have given a more thorough mechanistic 
account; I will base my discussion around both of these. However, I should begin my explanation of 
these mixed predictive processing theories by saying something about the distinction between mod-
el-free and model-based processes, since one way to develop a mixed view of predictive processing is 
to have model-free processes play the role of motivating action, and thereby giving an answer to the 
(negative) dark room problem that takes the horn of the dilemma on which action is driven by pro-
cesses other than surprise-minimisation of the kind posited in PP.9
The distinction between model-based and model-free processes originates in the study of rein-
forcement learning, where it is used to distinguish between a process that learns the value of available 
options by trial and error, and without a model of the causal structure of the environment—this is 
model-free—and learning that assigns value on the basis of a model of how rewarding events in the 
world are statistically related to other events—this is model-based (Gläscher et al. 2010). PP would 
fall unambiguously under the “model-based” category of learning processes. Model-free processes are 
attractive in the context of the dark room problem because they may be construed as offering a set of 
imperatives to action which could be mixed with the standard PP mechanism of surprise minimis-
ation in order to yield imperatives to action that look genuinely “motivational,” and which therefore 
entail action that defeats the dark room problem. For example, it may be that there is a mechanism 
underlying action that causes an agent to indiscriminately seek out and consume sources as reward 
on the basis of availability, and drives action in this way. Ainslie’s (Ainslie 2001) behavioural findings 
of hyperbolic discounting could be indicative of such a mechanism. He has found in studies both in 
animal models and human participants that the way rewards are valued increases steeply as they ap-
proach in time, and that smaller but more immediate rewards tend to be consumed in preference to 
temporally distant but larger rewards in decision-making tasks. It may be that whatever mechanism 
produces this effect works in independence from any kind of model of the causes of reward, that is, it 
is model-free (cf., Clark 2016, pp. 252-256).
If this is the case, then a mixed theorist can give an answer to the dark problem which deals with all 
three aspects at a single stroke. The negative problem is clearly no issue, since the model-free mech-
anisms that drive action are not minimising surprise, they are reward-seeking and therefore attempt 
to bring the agent into contact with the appropriate stimuli. And cutting off the dark room problem 
this early in the dialectic also means that the other two issues (the positive problem and the triviality 
problem) do not come up, since those problems result from the sole appeal to a model in order to deal 
9 An anonymous referee has advised me that model-free processes can be understood within the context of predictive processing (e.g., Pezzulo et al. 
2015; also Clark 2016, § 8.6), and thereby constitute a complement to predictive processing rather than a competitor. That’s true. But it’s not necessary 
to do so, and to construe model-free processes in this way just means that the model is not genuinely mixed; it collapses into the maximal view.
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with the negative problem; this answer takes the other horn of the dilemma, which doesn’t lead to 
those two issues.
However, it is unlikely that many PP theorists are going to want to take this path. That is because 
it undermines one of the most attractive features of PP: the way in which it serves to unify the mech-
anisms underlying perception and action within a single theory. Indeed, one might observe that it 
solves the problems associated with PP by ceasing to be a PP theory; it fails to unify perception and 
action in the way that is extolled in the philosophical literature:
[PP] is a proposal that has already been applied to a large—and ever-increasing—variety of phe-
nomena. It thus serves as a powerful illustration of the potential of some such story to tackle a wide 
range of issues, illuminating perception, action, reason, emotion, experience, understanding other 
agents, and the nature and origins of various pathologies and breakdowns. (Clark 2016, p. 10)
This may be one reason why authors have formulated mixed views on which the model-based process-
es themselves play an arbitrating role. That is to say that it is the models themselves which determine 
when model-free processes drive action, and when learning is instead contextualised within a model 
of the causes of sensory states. Again, Andy Clark holds a view like this: he thinks that “[…] a kind 
of meta-model […] would be used to determine and deploy whatever [model-based or model-free] 
resource is best in the current situation, toggling between them when the need arises.” (Clark 2016, p. 
253) This is an attractive view for other reasons, as well. There is evidence to suggest that model-free 
learning processes do not exist in isolation from those that are model-based, but rather that they are 
highly integrated (Daw et al. 2011).
Clark’s proposal, more specifically, is that model-free and model-based processes need to be un-
derstood as situated along a scale where the latter kind of learning is dominated by top-down influ-
ence within the generative hierarchical model and the former is dominated by bottom-up sensory 
influences. A mechanism of this sort is outlined more formally in Pezzulo et al. (Pezzulo et al. 2015). 
They envision the relationship between model-based and model-free in terms of a hierarchy where 
higher-levels within the model contextualise lower levels, and that learning is to be considered “mod-
el-free” when the higher levels fail to contextualise those lower. What determines whether contex-
tualisation occurs or not are assignments of precision within the model; when prediction errors are 
assigned higher precision values then they drive action in ways that are less contextualised, because 
the higher levels of the model exert less of an influence.
Notice, however, that it seems to be that that this kind of mixed PP view entails that all learning is 
minimally inferential and model-based, because there is no learning that is entirely independent of 
the meta-model. Certainly, Pezzulo et al. (Pezzulo et al. 2015, p. 32) seem to recognise this: “Strictly 
speaking […] habitual behaviour is not completely model free in that it continues to depend on the 
(simplest) type of predictive model, of the kind ‘because there is a stimulus, I expect a response’.” So 
a mixed-view, when it is properly elaborated, appears to in fact be a species of “maximal predictive 
processing” theory. That is because after all is said and done, surprise minimisation nonetheless re-
mains the sole imperative driving action, even in putatively “model-free” modes of learning. There-
fore, whether or not this view is successful in addressing the dark room problem depends on whether 
these maximal views are so successful. Let’s consider that now.
3.2  Maximal Predictive Processing 
Maximal predictive processing is the view that prediction-error minimisation is all that the brain ever 
does; all neurocognitive function can be explained in terms of the minimisation of surprise. So we aim 
to explain all cognition, and thereby all mental phenomena, in terms of prediction-error minimisa-
tion. The maximal theorist claims that the mammalian brain works (and only works) by minimising 
Sims, A. (2017). The Problems with Prediction  - The Dark Room Problem and the Scope Dispute.
In T. Metzinger & W. Wiese (Eds.). Philosophy and Predictive Processing: 23. Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958573246 11 | 18
www.predictive-mind.net
prediction error, but is agnostic on the question of whether or not other biological entities or systems 
function in this way.
In facing up to the negative aspect of the dark room problem, the maximal PP-theorist chooses to 
take the horn of the dilemma on which not all stimuli are minimally surprising. The way this works 
is to demonstrate that the minimisation of surprise is carried out with respect to a hierarchical gener-
ative model of the causal structure of the world. This model assigns probabilities to sensory states—
that is, it generates predictions—such that the agent anticipates that it will be in states that reflect the 
ecological niche to which it is adapted, which is that within which it can harvest reward and pass on 
its genes. Given that ecological niche is species-specific, it appears that there needs to be some kind of 
story given here about the origins of the priors which specify that niche. In other words, there must be 
a relation between the neural and surprise-minimising morphology of the agent and the non-neural 
but niche-specifying morphology of the agent, such that the non-neural morphology can play an ap-
propriate role within the model without itself being surprise-minimising. If non-neural morphology 
is in fact directly (and not vicariously) surprise-minimising, then this view collapses into the much 
stronger free energy principle which I discuss in section 3.3.
Now, there are a number of ways in which this general strategy may be pursued. One is to say that 
the relevant morphological traits are themselves represented within the model, and that this allows 
them to play a role in prediction-error minimisation without themselves minimising prediction error. 
With this in mind, a first attempt at such an account of morphological representation within the sur-
prise-minimising brain might focus upon the interoceptive prediction of the internal milieu (Craig 
2003). Interoceptive systems monitor the physiological states of the body such as “[…] those relating 
to heart rate, glucose levels, build-up of carbon dioxide in the bloodstream, temperature, inflamma-
tion, and so on.” (Barrett and Simmons 2015, p. 419) The prediction of these sensory states leads us to 
perceive them as feelings about those states. So, for example, we might interoceptively perceive dehy-
dration as thirst. There are influential attempts in the literature to account for interoception within the 
scope of PP (Seth 2013; Barrett and Simmons 2015). Within the PP framework the homeostatic states 
are those that are predicted, and deviation from those predicted states (deviation from interoceptive 
states associated with satiation, for instance) will lead the creature to take action in order to bring itself 
back into line with those states.
That seems a satisfactory first pass at how the basic PP story may be extended to take the mor-
phology of the agent into account. When it comes to the negative aspect of the dark room problem, 
this affords the following answer. The agent does not stay in the dark room because doing this would 
lead it to occupy sensory states that are surprising, states that are interoceptively perceived as hunger 
and thirst. Therefore, staying in this impoverished environment does not in fact minimise surprise, 
but rather elicits it. In other words, staying in that environment is a very poor strategy for the mini-
misation of surprise. A much better strategy is to actually get out and exploit richer environments for 
nourishment so that the interoceptive states can be brought back into line with prior expectations. The 
bottom line is that on this view we should not expect the dark room scenario to obtain. That is because 
the dark room problem does not take into account interoceptive sources of surprise, but only extero-
ceptive sources like vision and hearing. Furthermore, we could conceivably extend this undeveloped 
account to encompass those exteroceptive senses. For instance, the mammalian eye is structured in 
such a way that it is receptive to changing patterns of light. It is not unconceivable that part of the 
model reflects this morphological trait, eliciting surprise when such stimuli are absent. In other words, 
an absence of visual stimulation would itself be surprising.
Now, the answer to the negative aspect of the dark room problem that is given here is one which 
generates the positive problem. The stipulation of a model which specifies the expected states (states 
that are not the dark room) is subject to the issue that motivation is solely driven by prior beliefs, 
leaving no room for pro-attitudes as traditionally conceived. It is thought that this crowding out of 
pro-attitudes by prior beliefs would lead to an impoverished behavioural repertoire that would fail to 
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include the ubiquitous tendencies towards play, exploration, exploitation, and behaviours do not seem 
to be best conceived as the minimisation of surprise. There are two quite general answers to be given 
at this point.
The first, as set out in Schwartenbeck et al. (Schwartenbeck et al. 2013), has to do with the way that 
prediction-error minimisation is formalised within PP. More specifically, when an action policy is se-
lected amongst alternatives, the fact of uncertainty about outcomes will dictate that an agent attempts 
to visit many varied states with equal probability. That is because it will not be clear for the agent 
which states actually have the highest utility (construed in terms of prior beliefs). So there will be a 
shift between occupying the least surprising states and many novel states, depending on the level of 
uncertainty: “[…] when the differences in the expected utilities of outcomes become less differentia-
ble, agents will try to visit several states and not just the state that has highest utility.” (Schwartenbeck 
et al. 2013, p. 3) There will be a context-sensitive weighting of these two different kinds (exploitative 
and exploratory) kinds of strategy, where this weighting is influenced by the estimation of uncertainty 
through the assignment of precision as described in the first section of this paper.
In fact, this may seem to mirror the distinction between model-free and model-based modes of 
learning, as they are understood by both Pezzulo et al. (Pezzulo et al. 2015) and Clark (Clark 2016). 
That is because for them that distinction also appears to be a trade-off between two kinds of strategy 
that is arbitrated by the dynamics of precision assignment. Here, the agent would switch between 
exploratory and exploitative modes of engagement with the environment on the basis of how reliable 
their information is considered to be vis-à-vis the states that are least surprising (have the highest 
“value”). When such information is assigned very high precision values, then the agent engages in ex-
ploitative behaviours because there are states that are unambiguously more valuable than other states. 
But when such information is assigned low precision values, then the agent engages in exploratory 
behaviours because it is not sure which state will be most valuable (probable). 
The other answer to be given is that the minimisation of prediction error takes place within the 
context of a hierarchical model, which means that the minimisation of surprise is an optimisation 
process that occurs over very many levels of spatiotemporal generality. With this in mind, it may well 
be the case that intuitive appeals to putative counter-examples where there are unlikely events that 
have very high utility do not sufficiently take into account deeper imperatives, or a balance between 
those imperatives and others in the hierarchy. For example, in response to the question of Gershman 
and Daw (Gershman and Daw 2012, p. 306), “[s]hould a person immersed in the “statistical bath” of 
poverty her entire life refuse a winning lottery ticket[?]”, we might respond that although it is indeed 
true that for someone with a long history of poverty the state of sudden riches would be surprising, 
the deeper prior belief that compels the person towards keeping themselves fed or to acquire resources 
means that they will try to get themselves out of that situation of poverty if given such a chance. They 
won’t refuse the ticket. So perhaps we can account for apparent counter-examples of this kind by ap-
peal to distinctions between prior beliefs at different levels of hierarchical depth, or different levels of 
spatiotemporal generality. The deeper those beliefs are, the more likely they are to look like states with 
high utility rather than high prior probability. 
There is a vexing question that comes up at this point of appeal to evolutionarily selected “deep” 
prior beliefs. One may first suppose that some of these deep priors need not be genetically innate but 
can be extracted from the environment itself. These would be priors that are extracted from highly 
consistent regularities within the environment, for example, the inability of two solid objects to simul-
taneously occupy the same space (cf., Hohwy et al. 2008, p. 692). However, it is unlikely that all such 
deep priors can be accounted for in this way. That is because many such priors will be idiosyncratic to 
whatever species the agent belongs to. Since the regularities that are extracted from the environment 
are presumably in the environment, they must remain constant across species. So if the deep prior 
in question is idiosyncratic to species (e.g., some prior or set of priors that produces a behavioral 
disposition to seek out dark environments in troglofauna, for instance), then it appears that it cannot 
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be learned from the environment. It must be innate. So the question I have in mind can be posed as 
follows.
We think that we know that brains perform many of their tasks in virtue of their performing active 
inference. Now it appears that in order for us to be able to explain motivation within a pure active-in-
ference framework we need to posit innate priors. These innate priors are determined by the total 
morphology of the organism, insofar as this morphology is isomorphic with an optimum trajectory or 
a set of good-enough trajectories through state space. So the question is this: how does the non-neural 
morphology play the right role in active inference? This can’t just be through its representation in ac-
tive inference, because then there’s no reason those innate priors don’t just update when they encoun-
ter prediction error—why they are recalcitrant. Having the priors themselves be fixed morphological 
traits or processes (metabolism, for instance) addresses this issue, but then we have a problem about 
the computational interaction between neural and non-neural morphology. How is such interaction 
to be explained?
I will be arguing that the free energy principle, as developed and applied by Friston and his collab-
orators, provides one kind of answer to such questions. This is a kind of PP that is expanded in scope 
in order that it constitutes an explanation of biological adaptation in general, and on various time-
scales. In order to give a full reply to the dark room problem, the maximal-PP theorist is obliged to go 
further and either: i) embed PP within the wider scoped free energy principle; or ii) give an alternative 
account. I am open to the idea that there is an alternative account available, but in the rest of this paper 
I will be exploring (i).
3.3  The Free Energy Principle 
It looks as though a satisfactory answer to questions about how we came to have the priors that we 
have can be given by embedding the maximal PP story within the wider scoped free energy principle. 
The free energy principle gives a surprise-minimisation account of biological processes in general, 
which affords us a way to explain the origin of the prior beliefs that are relevant to answering the dark 
room problem and the way in which those prior beliefs are related to morphological facts about the 
agent. But to see why this is so it’s first necessary to set out the theory in sufficient detail.
We can start by explaining its initial motivation. The free energy principle is usually motivated by a 
much more general reflection on a putative distinction between biological and non-biological self-or-
ganising systems (e.g., Friston and Stephan 2007, §2.2). An example of the former kind might be a 
bird, or a bacterium. An example of the latter kind might be a snowflake, or a hurricane. Both of these 
kinds of complex system exhibit self-organisation; that means that they both spontaneously arrange 
themselves into an ordered pattern or structure without the intervention of an outside agent (Ashby 
1962). However, Friston and Stephan (Friston and Stephan 2007) note a qualitative difference between 
them. The difference is that biological systems are adaptive. In the case of a snowflake, for instance, 
it will cross a phase boundary and melt with the change of temperature. But the “[…] key aspect of 
biological systems is that they act upon the environment to change their position within it, or relation 
to it, in a way that precludes extremes of temperature, pressure or other external fields.” (Friston and 
Stephan 2007, p. 422)
The distinction may not be as stark as these authors suggest. After all, given sufficiently rapid and 
intense changes in temperature, biological systems also dissipate into the environment. That is to say 
that systems like snowflakes are not unique in this respect. Conversely, one may give potential exam-
ples of self-organising systems that act on their environment but that are non-biological. Aggregates of 
biological systems (like societies) act on their environments in some way, but it would be controversial 
to label these biological in the same way as their constituents are. But critique of this kind lacks pro-
priety; Friston and Stephan are not doing conceptual analysis, they are suggesting constraints on the 
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behaviour of biological systems for heuristic purposes. Their question is this: how is it possible for a 
biological system to avoid dissipation? For this purpose, their loose distinction is sufficient.
One way to understand that capacity is in terms of an exchange of energy between the organism 
and its environment. This reflects the traditional biophysical understanding of biological systems as 
energetically open systems: they take in energy and matter in a low-entropy form as nutrition (con-
strued broadly) and excrete it back into the environment in the form of relatively high-entropy waste. 
This allows us to reconcile the increase of complexity and order in living systems with the second law 
of thermodynamics, which states that entropy is always increasing in closed systems. The biological 
system is an open system, which allows it complexity and order at the expense of its surrounding en-
vironment (Schrödinger 1944).
Another way to understand this capacity of regulating the relationship to environment is in terms 
of information—it is to understand the capacity as that of moving around within a particular set of 
sensory states to which the system is suited. That set of states is implicitly specified by the phenotype of 
the system, because the system is already evolutionarily adapted to some specific environmental niche. 
A ferrophilic bacterium, for example, is adapted to a solution which contains specific levels of iron and 
oxygen. As such its phenotype will bear some substantive relation—perhaps representational (Shea 
2012)—to this niche, and must alter its relationship to the environment in line with that relation. If 
the relation is construed in terms of representation, for instance, then it must regulate its relationship 
to the environment so that the propriety-conditions of that representation are satisfied.
These two ways of understanding biological systems—thermodynamic and informational—are 
complementary. Even though the environment is always becoming more and more disordered, it 
nonetheless behaves in a regular and lawful way, and the exploitation of this regularity makes it pos-
sible for the biological system to embed that regularity into its physical structure: “organisms could 
maintain configurational order, if they transcribed physical laws governing their environment into 
their structure.” (Friston and Stephan 2007, p. 422)
How do biological systems manage to do this? On the free energy principle, the task is construed as 
a problem of Bayesian inference. The inference in question occurs across a boundary that segregates 
the internal states of the system and its external environment—this boundary is called a Markov blan-
ket. Markov blankets consist of two kinds of state: sensory states and active states. The prototypical 
example of some such boundary is the cell wall. The task of the biological system is to infer the causes 
that act on it from the outside, with access only to the sensory states in the Markov blanket. The way 
that it does so can be modelled with the very same formalisms that govern active inference and belief 
updating in PP as applied to neurocognitive function. That is to say that the system approximates a 
model of the causes of its sensory states in two ways: by updating its internal states where those states 
fail to correspond to sensory states, and by acting on its environment in order to change the way that 
the outside causes generate sensory states.
These very abstract considerations can be illustrated more concretely with reference to the example 
of circadian rhythmicity (Bechtel 2011; Sheredos 2012). Circadian rhythms are periodic cycles which 
regulate other processes (metabolic, behavioural, genetic, and so on) on a roughly 24 hour period. 
These are sensitive to external cues (so-called Zeitgebers) in calibrating the clock, but the rhythm is 
endogenously produced, which means that its periodicity will remain in effect even in the absence of 
any Zeitgebers. Sheredos (Sheredos 2012) has argued that the circadian rhythms of cyanobacteria are 
cognitive in the minimal sense specified by the free energy principle. That is to say that the systems 
which perform circadian rhythmicity perform prediction-error minimisation. The circadian rhythm 
in the cyanobacterium regulates two metabolic processes that are chemically incompatible: photo-
synthesis (day-time) and nitrogen fixation (night-time). Roughly, the endogenous tendency of the 
system to a default period and phase of rhythm can be construed as the priors, and the sensitivity to 
Zeitgebers can be construed as producing prediction error in the system. In the cyanobacterium, the 
function of signalling prediction error is realised by high levels of phosphate, which are both produced 
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during photosynthesis and play a central role in transforming the protein which regulates the circa-
dian cycle. So if the bacterium is unexpectedly performing photosynthesis at a time when it predicts 
there should be low levels of ambient light, the relatively high levels of phosphate will phosphorylate 
the protein regulating the circadian cycle, and this will recalibrate the clock. This feedback mechanism 
instantiates the hierarchical and bidirectional feedback mechanism that the free energy principle (and 
PP) describes, but it does so within a non-neural system. According to the free energy principle, all 
adaptive behaviour is like this.
The free energy principle may also be considered to apply over longer time scales (Friston 2013; 
Friston et al. 2015; Hobson and Friston 2016). One may distinguish functional (metabolism, learning, 
and inference), developmental, and even phylogenetic time scales in this regard. Natural selection 
takes place over very many generations of individual phenotypes; persistent self-organisation emerges 
from a fluctuating environment with a general tendency towards disorder, and at the expense of the 
order in that environment. Hobson and Friston (Hobson and Friston 2016) therefore suggest that 
natural selection can be explained under the same mathematical formalism as in PP when applied to 
brain function. Namely, natural selection is to be construed as a process wherein a genotype models 
the causal regularities (in this case, selection pressures) that impinge upon it from without, and in do-
ing so embeds this causal structure into the phenotype across multiple generations. Each generation 
is understood to be a Bayesian “update” on the basis of prediction error that corresponds to selection 
pressures that the phenotype is not yet adapted to:
[…] in natural selection, each new generation corresponds to a Bayesian update, converting a prior 
distribution over phenotypic characteristics into a posterior distribution. […] this means that evo-
lution is the process of predicting which phenotypes are best adapted to their econiche. (Hobson 
and Friston 2016, p. 247)
Again a specific example will be helpful. Circadian rhythmicity has a genetic component, as de-
scribed in (Bechtel 2011). One could construe the endogenous tendency to rhythmicity as the “prior” 
which is updated on the basis of prediction error that results if Zeitgebers are out of sync with that 
prior. For instance, if a cyanobacterium is introduced into an environment where the day-night cycle 
is different (e.g., a different time zone), then its periodicity will be updated on this basis (the phase 
may well remain the same, if the length of the day itself is the same). However, we may ask questions 
about how it is that the periodicity has this endogeneity in the first place. The obvious answer is that it 
is genetic, but this just labels the problem and leaves the mechanism obscure. Bechtel (Bechtel 2011, 
p. 145) has shown that—in much the same way as the circadian rhythm itself—the genetic basis of 
the rhythm can be understood as instantiating a feedback mechanism that is regulated on the basis 
of error. The empirical research which is the basis of his discussion targets the circadian rhythm in 
fruit flies (Hardin et al. 1990). That research demonstrates that the genetic basis (the gene per) of the 
prior is down-regulated by high levels of the protein (PER) that it expresses; when there is a buildup 
of PER, this acts on the gene to prevent further generation of the protein. The period of this process is 
circadian: it occurs over a roughly 24-hour period.
With the foregoing example in mind, here’s how the introduction of the free energy principle aids 
us in answering the questions about priors driving action. The first thing to point out is that the mech-
anism of free energy minimisation is not arbitrarily limited to instantiation in a neural realisation 
base; any realisation base that is sufficiently complex will be enough. The example of the circadian 
rhythms suggests that a chemical basis may be sufficient to realise active inference, and that a neural 
realisation is probably not necessary. The second thing to note is that the functional continuity be-
tween various otherwise distinct systems (genetic, cognitive, and behavioural) means that one can 
locate the origins of priors in different systems and across different timescales; one need not have a 
single centre of cognition which somehow respects facts about the morphology of the agent by means 
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of representing those facts in some way. Within this context, the relevant non-neural facts about the 
agent that make it so that the agent moves into and around a specific environmental niche are not 
themselves “dumb” or computationally inert, but are built into the computational machinery of active 
inference itself. So, in fact, there is no hard interface between the brain and the morphological facts 
that it requires access to in order to drive action in the right ways. So, in principle, both the origins of 
prior beliefs can be given along with a constraint on the account of how they input into processes of 
learning, inference, and action.
On the basis of these lines of reasoning, it seems to me that maximal PP that is grounded with-
in the free energy principle is well-equipped to handle the concerns associated with the dark room 
problem. But the problem of triviality is yet significant. Clark gives voice to these concerns when he 
suggests that to excessively widen the scope of PP threatens “[…] to over-intellectualize large swatches 
of adaptive response in both human and non-human animals.” (Clark 2013b, p. 8) But of course, the 
danger of the problem depends on what exactly this over-intellectualisation amounts to. If it commits 
us to saying that bacteria or genomes have attention, or imagine, or suffer from schizophrenia, then 
of course this seems like a debauched extension of anthropic notions into domains where they do not 
belong. But if we are simply placing functional requirements on those simpler systems, then this anx-
iety seems out of place.
Perhaps on this point we need to bite the bullet of Klein’s suggestion – perhaps the free energy 
principle is a Galilean idealisation. However, something similar may be true of the laws of physics 
(Cartwright 1986), and these are nonetheless considered to be a significant advancement in scientific 
knowledge and highly valuable in constraining scientific models in more specific contexts. The same 
may be true of the free energy principle, which could serve to constrain theorising about specific 
mechanisms in cases like that of the circadian rhythm, neurocognitive function, and perhaps in future 
even social and aggregate entities (cf., Friston and Frith 2015). In that case its criteria for endorsement 
would be largely pragmatic.
4  Conclusion
The dark room problem is both plural and significant. I’ve tried to show here how the various concerns 
that constitute the problem emerge in the dialectic between PP-theorists and PP-critics. The initial 
puzzle—the negative problem—is an intuitive and naïve one. The question can be phrased like this: if 
action is just the minimisation of surprise, then why don’t we try to minimise all stimuli? The answer 
to this question must either devalue the role of surprise-minimisation or explain why not all stimuli 
are surprising. Mixed PP views take the first horn of this dilemma by specifying mechanisms under-
lying action which do not work via surprise minimisation. One way to do so, I argued, is to appeal to 
“model-free” learning processes. These are reinforcement-learning schemes that do not require any 
representation of the way that events are statistically related to one another; they learn the value of 
different actions through trial and error.
Another way to construct a mixed PP view is to have both model-free and model-based processes 
integrated within a ‘meta-model’: within the predictive-processing architecture itself. Then, I argued, 
this just collapses into a maximal predictive processing view—that is the view that predictive process-
ing is all that the brain ever does, and so all neurocognitive function must be explained in terms of 
surprise minimisation. If this view is endorsed, then the PP-theorist is taking the horn of the dilemma 
on which not all stimuli are surprising; that is because some are assigned a high probability within 
a model of the causes of sensory states. Then the maximal-PP theorist is obliged to respond to the 
positive aspect of the dark room problem: how does surprise-minimisation account for behavioural 
repertoires which include exploration and exploitation?
I suggested that the maximal-PP theorist can give two related answers. The first, following a sug-
gestion by Schwartenbeck et al. (Schwartenbeck et al. 2013), is that exploratory and exploitative be-
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haviours will be selected according to a trade-off that is driven by the dynamics of precision assign-
ment. When beliefs about which states are “valuable” are imprecise, then the agent will try to occupy 
all of them (and find novel ones) in the exploratory mode; when beliefs about such states are precise, 
then the agent will just occupy those which are most valuable, in the exploitative mode. Second, ap-
peals to prior beliefs which are deeper in the hierarchy can help explain why some states appear to 
have low probability but high value: it is because they entail deeper states that do have a high probabil-
ity (winning a lottery entails having access to resources).
However, this raises puzzles about the origins of “deep” priors as well as how genetic information 
might interface with priors that are active in learning and inference in ontogenetic time. The free ener-
gy principle provides some suggestions here, though there is still much to be done in this regard. The 
example of circadian rhythms demonstrates how functional continuity can be established between 
free energy minimisation in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic time, thereby suggesting a relatively 
robust account of the way in which tendencies to particular kinds of action can originate in evolution-
ary processes. However, this raises questions about whether expanding Bayesian active inference to 
so wide a scope does not sap the free energy principle of any substantive empirical content. I think it 
is possible that this may be the case. But if it is, we may well go on to ask what such triviality amounts 
to if the account is both explanatory and of use as a heuristic. Certainly it must not be trivial in any 
sense that should worry us. But that is a challenge that may be taken up by the critics of PP in future.
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